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EVALUATING A PERMANENT COURT SOLUTION FOR
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES
ABSTRACT
Despite the original objective of investor state dispute settlement
(“ISDS”)—to create an unbiased arbitration mechanism to resolve
conflicts between states and foreign investors—ISDS tribunals have
gained the reputation of being one-sided, nontransparent, and inconsistent in decisions rendered. A major reform proposed to address the criticism of ISDS is the creation of one permanent tribunal, rather than numerous ad hoc tribunals constituted separately
for each investment dispute. Discussion of ISDS reform in light of
its historical context poses the question: is ISDS really a broken system, or have our global priorities and concerns changed over time?
While improvements can be made, the current ISDS system is still
faithfully serving its original purpose as a neutral tribunal where
disputes can be arbitrated. In contrast, the creation of a permanent
investment tribunal may thwart the principles envisioned for ISDS
at its inception, most importantly, the balance between the protection of state sovereignty and the recognition of the investor as an
autonomous private entity. This comment discusses a permanent
court solution to international investment disputes in light of the
European Council’s 2018 directive authorizing the European Commission to negotiate, on behalf of the European Union, a convention
to establish a permanent body to settle investment disputes called
the multilateral investment court (“MIC”). It compares the proposed
MIC with the structure of the permanent investment tribunal,
known as the Investment Court System, contemplated by the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement. Ultimately, this comment concludes that ISDS tribunals can address many concerns
through reform to the existing ad hoc system without requiring permanency, thus continuing to respect the original aims of the ISDS
system and to foster international investment.
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INTRODUCTION
As the number of investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”)
cases have increased over the years, so has criticism regarding
ISDS tribunals and their impermanent, ad hoc nature. 1 Despite
the original objective of ISDS—to create an unbiased arbitration
mechanism to resolve conflicts between states and foreign investors—ISDS tribunals have gained a reputation for being one-sided,
nontransparent, and inconsistent in their rulings. 2 Critics of ISDS
can be found throughout the legal and policy world—including academics, lawyers who have participated in ISDS either through
representation or as arbitrators, nongovernmental organizations,
and interest groups. 3 Currently, different forms of ISDS are included in over 3000 international agreements, and the number of
cases referred to international investment tribunals has increased. 4 The growing prevalence of ISDS in treaties, coupled with
the importance of foreign investing to the global economy, have led
to public debate regarding appropriate solutions to the problems
raised by critics of ISDS. 5
1. See Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the
Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471 (2009) (discussing the
growth of international investment law). In contrast to domestic courts, international courts
and tribunals face constant attacks regarding their “legitimacy,” including debates about
their methods and limits for dispute resolution. Id. While “[t]his holds true for any of the
many international dispute-settlement bodies” created in the past two decades, it is especially true in international investment disputes. Id. at 471–72; see also DAVID COLLINS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 227 (2017) (defining “ad hoc” as a tribunal “constituted for that particular dispute at hand outside an institutional framework”).
2. See Chris Evans, ISDS: Important Questions and Answers, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 26,
2015, 4:49 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/03/26/isds-important-ques
tions-and-answers [https://perma.cc/6YNV-T7QA]; Fact Sheet: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Mar. 2015), https://ustr.gov/about-us/pol
icy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2015/march/investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds
[https://perma.cc/L7PN-DRCK] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018) [hereinafter Fact Sheet]. For a full
discussion of the original ISDS objectives versus the Tribunal's current reputation, see infra
Part II.
3. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INT’L AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT: FROM AD HOC ARBITRATION TO A PERMANENT COURT 8 (2015) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT], https://aiv-advies.nl/download/9a2c
1343-80f8-4c2f-a16d-ab992d31f7b7.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6S2-RU3M].
4. Fact Sheet, supra note 2; see Press Release, United Nations Conference on Trade &
Dev. Number of International Investment Disputes Mushroomed in 2012, UNCTAD Reports
(Apr. 10, 2013), https://unctad.org/en/pages/PressRelease.aspx?OriginalVersionID=120
[https://perma.cc/L9X8-GN9U].
5. See SURYA P. SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: RECONCILING POLICY AND
PRINCIPLE 283 (3d ed. 2016); Brower & Schill, supra note 1, at 472; Florian Grisel & Thomas
Schultz, From Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunals to Permanent Courts: Three Examples, OUPBLOG
(Sept. 14, 2015), https://blog.oup.com/2015/09/arbitral-tribunals-permanent-courts/ [https://
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The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(“UNCITRAL”) formed Working Group III in response to the global
desire for an evaluation of the current system and tasked them
with crafting potential reforms. 6 The mandate given to the Working Group III contained three stages: “(i) first identify and consider
concerns regarding ISDS; (ii) second, consider whether reform was
desirable in light of any identified concerns; and (iii) third, if the
Working Group were to conclude that reform was desirable, develop any relevant solutions to be recommended to the Commission.” 7 Examining the product of Working Group III deliberations
is a valuable tool for assessing states’ attitudes towards ISDS because it was designed to be government-led and consensus-based. 8
A recent Working Group III session met in New York from April
23 to 27, 2018, and discussed procedural aspects of the arbitral process, outcomes, and transparency. 9 They focused on issues like lack
of accountability, consistency, the possibility of a review mechanism, and ways to address frivolous claims. 10 Additionally, they
discussed ways to fix the existing system, considering codes of conduct for arbitrators, decreasing third-party funding, and improving
public perception, while entertaining concerns from non-governmental organizations about the potential for a regulatory chill on
important legislation. 11 The Working Group will meet again to continue their discussion; to date, no firm reforms have been implemented and deliberations are ongoing. 12 However, this recent
Working Group III Session shows that the issue of ISDS reform is
on the international agenda.
A major reform discussed in the past in reaction to many ISDS
criticisms was the creation of one permanent tribunal, rather than
perma.cc/44T7-GDFF].
6. See Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute
Settlement Reform) on the Work of Its Thirty-Fourth Session (pt. I), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/930
/Rev. 1, at 2−3 (2017) [hereinafter Rep. on Thirty-Fourth Session], https://undocs.org/en/
A/CN.9/930/Rev.l [https://perma.cc/2HQS-UP4A]; Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the Work of Its Thirty-Fifth
Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/935, at 2 (2018) [hereinafter Rep. on Thirty-Fifth Session],
https://undocs.org/en/A/CN.9/935 [https://perma.cc/Q88Z-NDA6].
7. Rep. on Thirty-Fifth Session, supra note 6, at 2.
8. Rep. on Thirty-Fourth Session, supra note 6, at 3.
9. Rep. on Thirty-Fifth Session, supra note 6, at 1, 5, 8.
10. See id. at 4.
11. See id. at 10, 14–15.
12. See Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-First Session, U.N.
Doc. A/73/17, at 23 (2018), https://undocs.org/en/A/73/17 [https://perma.cc/W59D-T5XL];
Rep. on Thirty-Fifth Session, supra note 16.
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numerous ad hoc tribunals that are constituted separately for each
investment dispute. 13 This idea has surfaced periodically during
negotiations of important mega-regional investment treaties, such
as the European Union (“EU”)-Canada Comprehensive Economic
and Trade Agreement (“CETA”), the EU-United States Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”), and the TransPacific Partnership (“TPP”). 14 CETA went so far as to create a permanent investment tribunal, known as the Investment Court System (“ICS”). 15 However, the CETA provision which purported to
create the ICS is not included in the part of the agreement now
provisionally in force. 16 As a result, its effectiveness has not yet
been evaluated.
Despite the non-implementation of CETA’s ICS, the creation of
a permanent body for dispute resolution is a solution embraced by
many internationally. On March 20, 2018, the European Council
issued a directive authorizing the European Commission to negotiate, on behalf of the EU, a convention to establish a permanent
body to settle investment disputes. 17 This multilateral investment
13. See Grisel & Schultz, supra note 5 (comparing the debate for a permanent tribunal
for investment disputes to the fifteen or more years it took to create the Permanent Court
of Justice, which is now the International Court of Justice).
14. See STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE E 15 INITIATIVE, REFORMING INVESTOR-STATE
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (ISDS): CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND OPTIONS FOR THE WAY
FORWARD (2015), http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/E15-Investment-Sch
ill-FINAL.pdf [perma.cc/FDK4-HAJT].
15. See CETA Explained, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Sept. 21, 2018), http://ec.europa.eu/
trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-explained/index_en.htm [https://perma.cc/A6CE-A9BT].
16. ERNEST & YOUNG, CANADA: PROVISIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE AGREEMENT
WITH EU IS DELAYED TO FALL 2017 DUE TO DAIRY, PHARMACEUTICALS, AND ISDS DISPUTES
2 (2017), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Alert:_Canada_provisional_implem
entation_of_trade_agreement_with_EU_is_delayed_to_Fall_2017_due_to_dairy_pharmace
uticals_and_ISDS_disputes/$FILE/2017G_04435-171Gbl_Indirect_Canada%20disputes%2
0delay%20CETA%20implementation.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R8Q-G5YY].
17. Council of the European Union Press Release 144/18, Multilateral Investment
Court: Council Gives Mandate to the Commission to Open Negotiations (Mar. 20, 2018),
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/03/20/multilateral-investme
nt-court-council-gives-mandate-to-the-commission-to-open-negotiations/pdf [https://perma.
cc/KJR9-6TEV] EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström said of the negotiations:
This is a very welcome decision. In the EU’s bilateral trade talks, we have already moved away from the old ISDS model towards the modern and transparent investment court system. Looking ahead to the long term, the multilateral
level will be highly important for managing the growing number of bilateral
investment agreements . . . . We can now continue working with like-minded
partners around the globe, towards launching negotiations to create a multilateral investment courtknowing that EU citizens are fully informed of our
negotiating instructions.
Commission Welcomes Adoption of Negotiating Directives for a Multilateral Investment
Court, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Mar. 20, 2018), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.
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court (“MIC”) would replace existing bilateral investment court
systems included in EU trade and investment agreements. 18 The
European Commission has been working internationally to promote acceptance of the MIC multilaterally through dialogue with
third-party countries and the promotion of discussion in multilateral bodies. 19 Originally proposed in 2015, this directive shows that
the European Commission is serious about trying to implement reform within the realm of international investment. 20
In evaluating a permanent ISDS tribunal solution, it is important to keep in mind the original purpose and vision of ISDS.
Foreign investment has been an economic reality throughout human history, dating back as early as 1500 B.C. 21 International investment tribunals were created as an independent forum for settling disputes, as a way to maintain and adapt this tradition to the
contours of the modern-day global economy. 22 This established a
sort of middle ground between protecting the investor and respecting state sovereignty by choosing neither the investor state nor the
host state as the site of the arbitration. 23 It also helped set the
minds of investors at ease, who would otherwise be forced to bring
a claim in domestic court, thereby risking possible bias. 24 Private
investors were also assured that they had additional rights when
investing in countries that had legal standards lower than their

cfm?id=1819 [https://perma.cc/KB7E-263S] [hereinafter Commission Welcomes Investment
Court].
18. Rep. on Thirty-Fifth Session, supra note 6, at 4–5.
19. EUROPEAN COMM’N, A MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT COURT: A NEW SYSTEM FOR
RESOLVING DISPUTES BETWEEN FOREIGN INVESTORS AND STATES IN A FAIR AND EFFICIENT
WAY 2 (2017) [hereinafter NEW SYSTEM FOR RESOLVING DISPUTES], http://trade.ec.eu
ropa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/september/tradoc_156042.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y6VH-8BP2].
These discussions have been cosponsored by Canada. Id. UNCITRAL has also begun discussion of possible multilateral approaches to ISDS. Id.
20. See id.
21. See generally COLLINS, supra note 1, at 6 (discussing the history of international
investment law). One of the earliest known examples of international investment is the
Phoenicians, a civilization extant in 1500 B.C. that established commercial outposts around
the Eastern Mediterranean to facilitate trade. Id.
22. Id. at 217.
23. See id. (“From the host state’s point of view, the courts of the investor’s home state,
which will also have a reasonably close connection to the dispute through the nationality of
the claimant, will be unsuitable fora. As respondent, the host state will often mistrust the
courts of the home state for similar reasons . . . . It could fear that the home state will be
biased in favour of the investor, or lack an understanding . . . of the particular legal environment in which the challenged laws have been enacted.”).
24. See Brower & Schill, supra note 1, at 491 (explaining how the rise in trans-border
investment is a consequence of the end of the Cold War).
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own. 25 In theory, this created a fair and reciprocal business relationship, as the existence of the tribunal facilitated international
investment, which was both good for the investor and for strengthening the host state’s economy.
Discussion of ISDS reforms in light of their historical context
poses the question: is ISDS really a broken system, or have our
global priorities and concerns changed over time? While changes
could be made to improve the ISDS system, it is still faithfully serving its original purpose overall. 26 It is still a neutral tribunal where
disputes can be arbitrated, thereby facilitating foreign investment
in host states. In contrast, the creation of a permanent investment
tribunal may thwart the principles envisioned for ISDS at its inception—most importantly, the balance between the protection of
state sovereignty and the recognition of the investor as an autonomous private entity.
This comment will explore the potential benefits and drawbacks
of reforming ISDS, ultimately concluding that permanent investment tribunals may not be the best method of preserving the delicate and critical function facilitated by ISDS. First, this comment
will provide a brief background on the ICS and the MIC, the two
major proposed permanent courts for ISDS cases, and explain how
these bodies are meant to function compared to traditional ISDS
tribunals. Next, it will focus on three major concerns that permanent investment tribunals are meant to solve—legitimacy, consistency and transparency—and explain why critics believe these
are problem areas. 27 It will evaluate whether permanent investment tribunals can solve these issues while still adhering to the
original aims of ISDS. Finally, this comment will propose methods
of reforming the extant ad hoc ISDS tribunals in response to the
international community’s legitimate concerns in a way that does
not require a permanent tribunal.

25. Wolfgang Koeth, Can the Investment Court System (ICS) Save TTIP and CETA? 2
(European Inst. of Pub. Admin., Working Paper No. 2016/W/01), https://www.eipa.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/20161019072755_Workingpaper2016_W_01.pdf [https://perma.cc
/7CPG-QYPJ].
26. See Fact Sheet, supra note 2; Alison Ross, A 15-Headed Hydra?, 13 GLOBAL ARB.
REV. 12, 13 (2018) (“Why do these acknowledged leaders of investment dispute arbitration
as we know it bring termites into our wooden house of investor state dispute settlement?”).
27. See Rep. on Thirty-Fourth Session, supra note 6, at 7–8, 10, 12. “Legitimacy, consistency and transparency” seem to nicely sum up three of the major arguments against
ISDS as it currently stands. See id. This article will focus on these three critiques. See id.
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I. UNDERSTANDING PROPOSED PERMANENT ISDS MECHANISMS
A. The International Court System
On September 21, 2017, CETA provisionally went into effect, but
it must be ratified by national parliaments in the Member States
before taking full effect. 28 This may take some time, as member
states with regional parliaments, like Belgium, have to wait for
each of their provincial legislatures to formally ratify CETA. 29
CETA is the first significant free trade agreement that aims to implement the ICS in place of the old ISDS system. 30 The ICS was
not included as one of the parts of CETA now provisionally in force;
however, it has served as an impetus for discussion about whether
the future of investment dispute resolution lies in permanent
courts. 31 The objective of CETA is to:
meet[] the high expectations of citizens and industry for a fairer, more
transparent and institutionalised system of settling investment disputes [and] . . . ensur[e] a high level of protection for investors while

28. See CETA Explained, supra note 15.
29. Alison Ross, “Fake News”—Brower Blasts Investment Court Proposal, GLOBAL ARB.
REV. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1166223/-fake-news-brower
-blasts-investment-court-proposal [https://perma.cc/8394-EVRJ]. In 2017, Belgium requested that the EU’s Court of Justice (“CJEU”) issue an opinion regarding whether the
ICS would be compatible with EU law. Fatma Sassi, The Investment Court System (ICS)
and the EU Legal Order: An Impossible Love Story?, BERKELEY J. INT’L L. BLOG (Oct. 8,
2017), http://berkeleytravaux.com/investment-court-system-ics-eu-legal-order-impossiblelove-story-2/ [https://perma.cc/4GX8-37M4]. This presents an interesting issue about the potential threat of the ICS to the legitimacy of the CJEU, another international court where
legitimacy is imperative. Article 8.31 of CETA attempts to address the situation by stating
that:
The Tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to determine the legality of a measure,
alleged to constitute a breach of this Agreement, under the domestic law of the
disputing Party. For greater certainty, in determining the consistency of a
measure with this Agreement, the Tribunal may consider, as appropriate, the
domestic law of the disputing Party as a matter of fact. In doing so, the Tribunal shall follow the prevailing interpretation given to the domestic law by the
courts or authorities of that Party and any meaning given to domestic law by
the Tribunal shall not be binding upon the courts or the authorities of that
Party.
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-European Union, art. 8.31, Oct. 30,
2016, EU 006/2018: CM9622 [hereinafter CETA].
30. Bernard O’Connor & Isabella Aquilini, The Multilateral Investment Court, 18
LEXOLOGY 18, 19 (Feb. 3, 2017), https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.lexology.com/05365
b05-8bd5-4f3b-b358-e971f0c70672.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZSX-SE59].
31. See id.; CETA Explained, supra note 15 (clarifying that the three parts not yet in
force include: investment protection, investment market access for portfolio investment, and
the ICS).
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fully preserving the right of governments to regulate and pursue legitimate public policy objectives such as the protection of health,
safety, or the environment. 32

The ICS contemplates publicly appointed professional judges,
with exclusive jurisdiction to work transparently and would function much like other permanent international courts. 33 This differs
from the present ISDS system, which operates as an arbitral body
in the traditional sense. 34 The ICS will consist of fifteen judges: five
from Canada, five from the EU, and five from countries agreed on
by both states. 35 The qualifications to be a judge are similar to
those required by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), and
judges will be assigned to cases randomly to help ensure impartiality. 36 The ICS consists of two levels, as there would also be an Appellate Tribunal to review decisions rendered. 37 The Appellate Tribunal will consist of fifteen members nominated by the EU and
Canada, rather than arbitrators chosen by the investor and host
state. 38 Three randomly appointed members will hear each appeal. 39 In addition, the ICS will focus on transparency; all hearings
will be open to the public, and all court documents and tribunal
decisions will be available on the United Nations (“UN”) website. 40
B. The Permanent Multilateral Investment Court
As outlined by the Treaty of Lisbon, foreign direct investment
now falls within the purview of the EU, and is no longer the responsibility of the Member States, meaning that international protection agreements between the EU and third-party countries will

32. EUROPEAN COMM’N, INVESTMENT PROVISIONS IN THE EU-CANADA FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT (CETA) 1 (2016) [hereinafter INVESTMENT PROVISIONS IN CETA], http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151918.pdf [https://perma.cc/FQ57-HZQ5].
33. See id. at 1–2, 4.
34. DECHERT, LLP, THE EU SUCCEEDS IN ESTABLISHING A PERMANENT INVESTMENT
COURT IN ITS TRADE TREATIES WITH CANADA AND VIETNAM 2 (2016) [hereinafter THE EU
SUCCEEDS], https://www.dechert.com/content/dam/dechert/uploads/documents/The_EU_su
cceeds_in_establishing_a_permanent_investment_court_in_its_trade_treaties_with_Canad
a_and_Vietnam_-_Dechert_-_03242016.pdf [https://perma.cc/DVW3-5PV5].
35. Id.; see Ross, supra note 26, at 13.
36. See INVESTMENT PROVISIONS IN CETA, supra note 32, at 4.
37. THE EU SUCCEEDS, supra note 34, at 3.
38. INVESTMENT PROVISIONS IN CETA, supra note 32, at 4.
39. See CETA, supra note 29, at art. 8.28.
40. INVESTMENT PROVISIONS IN CETA, supra note 32, at 5. The parties will not be able
to waive this transparency, except in the case of business secrets and information considered
confidential under national law. Id.
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eventually replace similar bilateral agreements between Member
States and third-party countries. 41 Because these new agreements
will eventually represent a significant portion of international investment agreements signed, the EU was inspired to create an effective updated dispute resolution model. 42 When the European
Commission first attempted ISDS reform in 2015 (through discussions about including the ICS in the EU’s bilateral agreements), it
was simultaneously working on the MIC project. 43 The objective for
the MIC is to create a permanent body to decide investment disputes that would bring together certain features of domestic and
international courts. 44 This new multilateral investment court can
also be seen as a reaction to commonly voiced concerns regarding
the classic ad hoc ISDS mechanism, including “its lack of legitimacy, consistency and transparency.” 45 Some view the MIC model
as a continuation of the ICS, “used to address the setbacks that
arose in relation to the ICS.” 46 For example, the ICS was not wellreceived by certain European producers and business associations
as a desired forum compared to ISDS, but because the MIC lacks
the stigma associated with the ICS, it may be perceived more favorably. 47 The European Commission created the Factsheet on the
Multilateral Investment Court to highlight the differences between
the current ISDS system and the proposed MIC. 48
The European Commission describes the MIC as a court that
will be permanent, independent, predictable, comprehensive, costeffective, and transparent. 49 The tribunal would hear cases at both
a trial court and an appellate level, and would be empowered to

41. See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, O.J. (C306) 92; Consolidated Versions
of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
art. 207, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C326) 140.
42. See INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, supra note 3, at 10.
43. Commission Welcomes Investment Court, supra note 17.
44. See O’Connor & Aguilini, supra note 30, at 21–22.
45. Commission Welcomes Investment Court, supra note 17.
46. O’Connor & Aguilini, supra note 30, at 22.
47. See id. The European Consumer Organization argues that consumers are also unconvinced that the ICS is the appropriate way forward because it does not adequately address core flaws with ISDS. Monique Goyens, From ISDS to ICS: Still a Long Way to Go,
BEUC BLOG (Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.beuc.eu/blog/from-isds-to-ics-still-a-long-way-togo/ [https://perma.cc/42Z6-QVRH].
48. NEW SYSTEM FOR RESOLVING DISPUTES, supra note 19, at 3.
49. Id. In comparison to the adjectives listed above, the comparison chart notes that
ISDS is ad hoc, there are risks of partiality, it is unpredictable, inefficient, and opaque. Id.
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effectively enforce its decisions. 50 The MIC would employ tenured
judges, all of whom would be required to abide by a set of ethical
standards and would not be chosen by the parties. 51 The MIC
would also function transparently. 52 Overall, it would share many
features of the ICS created by CETA; however, because the ICS
functions bilaterally, it is unable to resolve disputes under many
existing investment treaties. 53 In contrast, the MIC could replace
existing bilateral ISDS mechanisms that are currently included in
EU investment and trade agreements. 54 Of the more than 3000 investment agreements which currently exist (including the over
1400 agreements entered into by EU Member States), most do not
contain any of the updated improvements that the European Commission is now trying to integrate into present investment agreements. 55 The MIC could replace what many see as outdated ISDS
provisions in a significant number of these older investment agreements. 56
II. WHY ISDS TRIBUNALS SHOULD REMAIN AD HOC RATHER THAN
BECOME PERMANENT
Three main categories of concern have been voiced by critics regarding the current ISDS system—legitimacy, consistency, and
transparency. This part will examine the bounds and contours of
each concern, concluding with an evaluation of whether a permanent court system would be able to respond to that concern. This
analysis exposes permanent investment courts as a short-term solution that diverges from the original aims of the ISDS regime that
are fundamental to its success. 57 At best, their creation is a distraction from true reform efforts; at worst, it has the potential to create
additional problems that could harm global investment overall.

50. Id.; INVESTMENT PROVISIONS IN CETA, supra note 32, at 4.
51. See NEW SYSTEM FOR RESOLVING DISPUTES, supra note 19, at 3.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2–3.
54. Id.; Commission Welcomes Investment Court, supra note 17.
55. NEW SYSTEM FOR RESOLVING DISPUTES, supra note 19, at 1.
56. Id.
57. “The Investment Court System would lessen certain attractive features of arbitration such as confidentiality (already somewhat diminished for UNCITRAL arbitrations) and
party autonomy in appointing adjudicators, while raising questions about costs, the duration of procedures and financing a new institution.” From International Investment Arbitration to an Investment Court System, ACERIS L. (July 1, 2017) [hereinafter International Investment Arbitration], https://www.acerislaw.com/international-investment-arbitration-in
vestment-court-system/ [https://perma.cc/CD5Z-3DMZ].
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A. The “Legitimacy” Concern: Arbitration Is Proinvestor at the
Expense of the State
One major critique of the current ISDS system is its lack of legitimacy, namely that: (1) the system is a bypass to domestic
courts; (2) tribunals are proinvestor; (3) arbitrators themselves are
biased; and (4) it chills national regulation because states fear future liability. This part discusses these legitimacy problems in
depth, analyzes whether a permanent court would somehow provide greater legitimacy, and considers whether reforms could be
implemented into the current system without the need to implement a permanent court structure.
1. The Current System Allows Parties to Bypass Domestic
Courts for International Tribunals
International investment disputes differ from the traditional
paradigm of international law, in which states are the only subjects
of international law with the capacity to raise claims. 58 Private
companies, unlike sovereign states, do not require the approval of
their home state to challenge another host state in an ISDS proceeding. 59 Because of this reality, many opponents view ISDS as a
way to bypass domestic law and national courts. 60 While some host

58. VALENTINA VADI, ANALOGIES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
ARBITRATION 56 (2016); see also Koeth, supra note 25, at 3, describing why the ISDS formed
the way it did:
These [ISDS] cases would be heard not before a local court, since one basic idea
behind ISDS was to assure investors’ rights in countries with poorly performing institutions, weak rule of law and high levels of corruption. Nor would these
cases be heard before an international jurisdiction (since private investors do
not have access to such jurisdictions). They would go before an arbitration
panel composed of international business lawyers, chosen by common accord
between the conflicting parties, and under rules that were stipulated in the
agreement.
59. See VADI, supra note 58, at 56.
60. EUROPEAN FED’N FOR INV. LAW & ARBITRATION (EFILA), A RESPONSE TO THE
CRITICISM AGAINST ISDS 1, 4 (2015) [hereinafter EUROPEAN FED’N], https://efila.org/wp-con
tent/uploads/2015/05/EFILA_in_response_to_the-criticism_of_ISDS_final_draft.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/4UCD-LWPY]. At one time, the state would have to petition domestically for its
sovereign to take on its investor’s case. See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1537 (2005). If the ICJ did find a violation of international law, an aggrieved investor would not necessarily receive the compensation for the
sovereign’s illegal conduct. Id. Additionally, the only enforcement method available is a Security Council Resolution "which is not commercially useful where an investor seeks financial compensation.” Id.
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states require that claimants exhaust all local remedies before that
state will accept jurisdiction in an international tribunal, other
states do not make local remedies mandatory in investment agreements. 61 Generally, it is the state’s responsibility to include such a
provision, and these provisions are not common in modern international investment agreements. 62 In addition, this bypass allows
foreign investors to have greater procedural rights than domestic
investors, who do not necessarily have access to an international
forum when national regulations negatively affect them. 63
The bypass is important to many investors who fear bias in national courts. As a way to address this concern, individual states
could require a case to begin at the domestic level before ISDS proceedings are initiated. 64 “Special chambers in appeals courts or
even supreme courts that are staffed with regular judges” may be
a viable forum for domestic recourse before pursuing an ISDS resolution. 65 As a result, rather than viewing the ISDS system as one
that bypasses domestic courts, ISDS tribunals can work in tandem
with national courts. 66 Alternatively, investors could be required
to gain the approval of their home state by submitting the dispute
to a preliminary governmental examination first. 67 Having the investor state government act as a gatekeeper may be a way to ensure legitimate claims, and therefore legitimacy as a whole. 68

61. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 224.
62. Id. at 225.
63. EUROPEAN FED’N, supra note 60, at 30. For example, when Argentina suffered an
economic crisis in the early 2000s and passed emergency laws that resulted in breach of
contract claims against the country, ICSID awarded damages to many foreign investors.
Charity L. Goodman, Comment, Uncharted Waters: Financial Crisis and Enforcement of
ICSID Awards in Argentina, 28 U. PENN. J. INT’L L. 449, 478 (2014). As a result, Argentina
argues “that ICSID has placed foreign investors that are covered by the ICSID agreement
above the domestic investors that must rely on the domestic Argentine system.” Id.
64. Schill, supra note 14, at 7.
65. Id.
66. See THE EU SUCCEEDS, supra note 34, at 5–6.
67. See Franck, supra note 60, at 1590.
68. See id.
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2. Tribunals Are Proinvestor
Those who see ISDS as a bypass of national courts allege that
these tribunals have a proinvestor bias that hinders their legitimacy. 69 However, proponents of the current system point to numbers. ISDS forums are not only currently used by many States, but
their use has increased over time. 70 Thus the continued, and increasing, use of ISDS tribunals reflects its perceived legitimacy in
the international sphere. The perception that tribunals are pro-investor has no evidentiary basis in ISDS data. 71 Statistical evidence
shows that States in arbitral proceedings consistently win more
cases than the investors. Of the 495 ISDS cases that were brought
to investor tribunals between 1987 and 2016, thirty-six percent
were decided in favor of the State, twenty-seven percent in favor of
the investor, with the remaining cases being dismissed. 72 Also, international agreements are intended to foster a mutually beneficial
relationship:
[B]oth the protection and promotion of foreign investment are primarily afforded, not for the private benefit of those foreign investors that
profit from the protections in question, but are put into place in response to the public interest of States in increasing foreign investment
flows and in taking advantage of the benefits foreign investment can
bring, such as the transfer of technology, the creation of employment
and tax income, and the increase in economic competitiveness. For the
collectivity of all host States, this interest constitutes a community
interest that is shared by all states participating in the IIL system. 73

69.
70.

See SUBEDI, supra note 5, at 273.
See INT’L CTR. SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, THE ICSID CASELOAD-STATISTICS
(ISSUE 2018-1) 7 (2018), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20We
b%20Stats%202018-1(English).pdf [https://perma.cc/9UTD-6ZRE] (displaying a bar graph
showing how the ICSID case load has increased from 1972 where there was only one case,
to 2017 where there were fifty-three cases).
71. See generally SUBEDI, supra note 5, at 273 (stating the possibility that this idea is
a reflection of older international investment agreements, which were drafted quite broadly,
leaving a lot of room for interpretation). As a result of this ambiguity, agreements were often
interpreted in light of their purpose, which was to protect the foreign investor. Id.
72. Ross, supra note 26, at 13–14.
73. Stephan W. Schill & Vladislav Djanic, International Investment Law and Community Interests 6 (Soc’y of Int’l Econ. Law, Working Paper No. 1, 2016) (emphasis added),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers/cfm?abstruct_id=2799500
[https://perma.cc/7FQQCA2V].
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3. ISDS Arbitrators Are Biased
Currently, there is not one accepted way for arbitrator selection
in ISDS; instead, it depends on the applicable treaty and the rules
governing the dispute. 74 As a result, critics argue that arbitrators
lack diversity, may not be qualified, and are biased. 75 The main
concern is that arbitrators in ad hoc proceedings are neither
elected nor accountable to anyone, but are instead party appointed. 76 Though accountability is often seen as a counter to independence, it is argued that accountability is needed in this context
to ensure impartiality. 77 Critics believe that because arbitrators
make their living based on what they are paid for arbitration appointments, self-interest leads the arbitrator to decide in a way
that is favorable to a specific party. 78 This alleged bias is further
evidenced by the fact that arbitrators are allowed to act as counsel
in proceedings that take place in between their arbitrator appointments. 79 Often called “double hatting,” an arbitrator can decide an
issue in one case, and later argue the same point in separate case
as counsel. 80
The ICS contains certain features to ensure that arbitrators are
not proinvestor. For example, the ICS will include a code of conduct
rather than just a requirement that arbitrators be impartial
through the treaty and rules of the arbitral body. 81 Additionally,
the permanency of judges in the ICS exists to minimize bias.
74. Brower & Schill, supra note 1, at 490.
75. See Chiara Giorgetti, Who Decides Who Decides in International Investment Arbitration?, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 431, 436, 490 (2013).
76. See id.
77. This would occur by implementing a transparent and uniform method for selection,
incorporating arbitrators into a permanent institution, and creating disciplinary power and
sanctions for accountability. GABRIELLE KAUFMANN-KOHLER & MICHELE POTESTÀ, GENEVA
CTR. FOR INT’L DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, THE COMPOSITION OF A MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT
COURT AND OF AN APPEAL MECHANISM FOR INVESTMENT AWARDS 60 (2017), http://www.unc
itral.org/pdf/english/workinggroups/wg_3/CIDS_Supplemental_Report.pdf [https://perma.
cc/Y7LC-63HG].
78. See id. at 45–46.
79. The Multilateral Investment Court: A Plausible Attempt at Reform, or Cosmetic
Changes Only?, UK LAW SOC’Y’S JOINT BRUSSELS OFF. (Sept. 21, 2017, 4:31 PM), http://
www.lawsocieties.eu/news/the-multilateral-investment-court-a-plausible-attempt-at-refor
m-or-cosmetic-changes-only/5062902.fullarticle [https://perma.cc/N3T2-G8NW].
80. Shreya Aren, Has the Time Come for the Establishment of a Permanent Investment
Court? The ‘Ayes’ Have It, PRAC. L.: ARB. BLOG, (Feb. 2, 2016), http://arbitrationblog.practi
callaw.com/has-the-time-come-for-the-establishment-of-a-permanent-investment-court-the
-ayes-have-it/ [https://perma.cc/4L4M-2LZM].
81. See KAUFMAN-KOHLER & POTESTÀ, supra note 77, at 53–54.
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Judges are prohibited from acting as counsel or as a party-appointed expert or witness in any pending or new dispute under any
agreement. 82 However, these solutions may not completely fix legitimacy issues. Though ICS judges will not be allowed to act as
counsel in any other ISDS case, they may continue acting as private lawyers outside of international investment treaties. 83 This
will lessen possible conflicts of interest, but may not completely
eliminate them. 84
The ICS judges will receive a retainer fee for the simple act of
being available, which can become a salary if the workload increases. 85 The CETA Joint Committee has the discretion to transform the retainer fee (estimated to be around 2.000€ per month)
and other fees paid by the parties per day into a regular salary,
and to decide applicable modalities and conditions. 86 The reason
for a retainer fee instead of a salary is based on the low amount of
cases anticipated. 87 Yet the retainer system method may actually
sustain the financial incentive for judges to accept as many cases
as possible, and to cause them to last as long as possible. 88 On the
other hand, if a fixed salary system is eventually implemented, the
salary may not be enough to entice high-quality judges to want to
serve permanently.
“If the concern was that private business lawyers serving as arbitrators have a natural bias towards the enterprise, could government-appointed judges not also be suspected of having a natural
bias towards the state, in particular their own?” 89 Having permanent appointees to the ICS or the MIC does not extinguish the possibility of an unbiased selection process. A permanent court would

82. CETA, supra note 29, at art. 8.30.
83. See id. (prohibiting ICS judges from acting as counsel under CETA and other international agreements, but not mentioning any other prohibitions on their work as lawyers).
84. See id.
85. LAURA PUCCIO & RODERICK HARTE, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERV.,
FROM ARBITRATION TO THE INVESTMENT COURT SYSTEM (ICS): THE EVOLUTION OF CETA
RULES 1 (2017), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/607251/EPRS
_IDA(2017)607251_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QA8-7YMY].
86. Inside CETA, Episode 1: Are Arbitration Tribunals a Threat to Democracy?, LE
MONDE (July 11, 2016), http://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2016/11/02/inside-cet
a-episode-1-are-arbitration-tribunals-a-threat-to-democracy_5024320_4355770.html
[https://perma.cc/3FWQ-WFX6] [hereinafter Inside CETA]; International Investment Arbitration, supra note 57.
87. See PUCCIO & HARTE, supra note 85, at 1.
88. See Inside CETA, supra note 86.
89. See Koeth, supra note 25, at 12.
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probably fare less well than the current arbitral system regarding
independence from political powers, but this may be what the
States want. 90 For example, the appointment of the fifteen judge
panel for the ICS (five judges from Canada, five judges from the
EU, and five judges from other nationalities) has the serious potential to be politically influenced. 91 Ensuring that the diverse Canadian provinces and all EU member states feel represented in the
ICS will prove challenging. 92 The CETA Joint Committee is the
body that will appoint the roster of Tribunal Members for the
ICS. 93 However, when the final selection of a tribunal is made by
an organ of state parties that is political by definition (like the
CETA Joint Committee) politics are bound to come into play. 94 Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to completely remove bias
from any system. This quote sums up the irony nicely:
[T]he supporters of the ISDS doubted the conceptualisation of the new
system, arguing that it would be based on states’ inclination to control
the system, meaning that all judges would be appointed by the state.
This would remove any control from the investors and diminish the
same legitimacy that the proponents of the court system were keen to
preserve. 95

For the most part, arbitrators care about maintaining an impartial reputation. 96 In addition, public observation also keeps arbitrators in check. 97 Arbitrators who do not live up to the expectation
of being objective will be viewed negatively by the relevant community, which is likely to have a detrimental impact on an arbitrator’s career. 98 Further, stronger safeguards than the potential ruin
of professional reputation are currently in place for many ISDS tribunals. Rules exist to challenge and remove arbitrators if they act
in a biased manner. 99 Statistics from various arbitral institutions
show an increase in arbitrator challenges over time. 100 Arbitrator
90.
91.
92.
93.

See Grisel & Schultz, supra note 5.
See Ross, supra note 26, at 13.
Id.
BEUC ET AL., JOINT ANALYSIS OF CETA’S INVESTMENT COURT SYSTEM (ICS):
PRIORITISING PRIVATE INVESTMENT OVER PUBLIC INTERST 5 (2016), http://epha.org/wp-con
tent/uploads/2016/07/Joint-Analysis-CETA-ICS-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/53WB-4P5Z].
94. KAUFMANN-KOHLER & POTESTÀ, supra note 77, at 62.
95. Aren, supra note 80.
96. See Brower & Schill, supra note 1, at 491.
97. Id. at 493.
98. Id.
99. Franck, supra note 60, at 1596.
100. Winnie Jo-Mei Ma, Procedures for Challenging Arbitrators: Lessons for and from
Taiwan, 5 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 293, 295 (2012).
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misconduct includes lack of impartiality, independence, fitness, or
qualifications. 101 Arbitrator challenges may also be valid grounds
for challenging the arbitral award itself. 102
The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), an institution that provides ad hoc arbitration services, helps to prevent bias by allowing the disqualification of an
arbitrator if that arbitrator is a national of the host state or has
the nationality of the investor. 103 To prevent frivolous disqualification claims, the applicable legal standard is objective, “based on
how a reasonable third party would evaluate the evidence,” rather
than the subjective belief of the party. 104 However, one issue with
the ICSID removal process is the fact that other members of the
Tribunal make the ultimate removal decision. 105 “The unchallenged arbitrators’ voting on the challenge may be affected by their
relationships with the challenged arbitrators, as well as by their
personal experiences with challenges—hence the risk of undue lenience towards the challenged arbitrators.” 106
CETA contains a removal provision for biased arbitrators in the
ICS that could help to solve this concern. 107 Based on paragraph 4,
when a disputing party detects a conflict of interest, the party
sends a notice challenging the appointment of the Tribunal Member to the President of the ICJ within fifteen days of the date on
which the composition of the division of the Tribunal has been communicated, or within fifteen days of the date when relevant facts
were made known. 108 If the Member has not voluntarily resigned
within fifteen days from the date of the notice, the President of the
ICJ hears the disputing parties, allows the challenged Member an
101. See Christopher Koch, Standards and Procedures for Disqualifying Arbitrators, 20
J. INT’L ARB. 325, 232, 336 (2003).
102. Franck, supra note 60, at 1596.
103. INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS
AND RULES 15, 22−23, 28, 103, 107 (2006) [hereinafter ICSID REGULATIONS AND RULES],
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/ICSID%20Convention%20English.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5TZQ-V8EN].
104. Disqualification of ArbitratorsAdditional Facility Arbitration, INT’L CTR.
SETTLEMENT INV. DISPS., https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/Disqualification-ofArbitrators---AF-Arbitration.aspx [https://perma.cc/4JQJ-BLA4] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
105. ICSID REGULATIONS AND RULES, supra note 103, at 29, 107–08. However, the decision will be made by the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council when the other
members are equally divided or where the proposal refers to a sole arbitrator or to a majority
of the Tribunal. Id.
106. Ma, supra note 100, at 299.
107. CETA, supra note 29, at art. 8.30.
108. Id.
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opportunity to submit any observations, and then issues a decision
within forty-five days. 109 Upon this recommendation from the President, or on their own joint initiative, the parties, “by decision of
the CETA Joint Committee, may remove a Member from the Tribunal where his or her behaviour is inconsistent with the obligations set out in paragraph 1 and incompatible with his or her continued membership of the Tribunal.” 110 Article 8.30 of CETA
discusses the requirement for arbitrators to be independent, not
affiliated with any government and to avoid participation in disputes that would create a conflict of interest. 111 ICSID could make
similar changes to its framework to tighten arbitrator removal procedures by, for example, having a third party authority in charge
of an arbitrator challenge. This would eliminate the issue of arbitrators making judgments as to the fitness of other challenged arbitrators, instead leaving that to someone in a more permanent
and removed position.
While the ISDS system may be enhanced by removal procedure
updates, one of the most important aspects of the ad hoc system is
the parties’ selection of arbitrators. 112 Allowing parties to choose
their own arbitrators reinforces the voluntariness of the proceeding and reflects the nature of ISDS, which stems from the intentional choice of both parties to enter into an investment relationship. 113 Giving both parties control over arbitrator selection makes
the parties more likely to utilize ISDS bodies and to comply with
decisions rendered. Appointments also protect state sovereignty by

109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id. Article 8.30 (1) states in full:
The Members of the Tribunal shall be independent. They shall not be affiliated
with any government. They shall not take instructions from any organisation,
or government with regard to matters related to the dispute. They shall not
participate in the consideration of any disputes that would create a direct or
indirect conflict of interest. They shall comply with the International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration or any
supplemental rules adopted pursuant to Article 8.44.2. In addition, upon appointment, they shall refrain from acting as counsel or as party-appointed expert or witness in any pending or new investment dispute under this or any
other international agreement.
Id. (footnote omitted).
112. See Brower & Schill, supra note 1, at 475, 489.
113. See INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON
THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (ICSID) 1,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/ICSID%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20ENGLISH.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3MCY-7ALQ] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
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allowing states to choose candidates who support their understanding of treaty interpretation. 114 Even when submitting cases
to the ICJ, states are able to appoint an ad hoc judge if there is not
already a judge of that states’ nationality sitting on the court. 115
This reflects the general desire to respect the diversity of states in
international proceedings. It is better for tribunals to strengthen
the selection and removal methods for an arbitrator than to rob
investors and states of the opportunity to choose.
4. The Threat of Litigation Causes a Regulatory Chill on
National Legislation
The most common ISDS critique made by states concerns legitimacy—states fear that investment treaties favor the interests of
investors over the states’ competing interests. 116 Under investment
treaties, states waive sovereign immunity and submit to international tribunal jurisdiction over national regulatory issues. 117
Thus, states are not only claiming that international investment
tribunals are impartial, but are more seriously contending that a
proinvestor bias interferes with its own state sovereignty by hindering a state’s ability to pass legislation for the good of its citizens. 118 Drafters of national legislation attempt to strike a balance
between respecting the expectations of foreign investors and the
host countries’ desire to regulate without liability. 119 This resulting
regulatory chill could impact the lives of the host state’s citizens,
114. Brower & Schill, supra note 1, at 494.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 471–72, 475. In contrast to domestic courts, international courts and tribunals
face constant attacks regarding their “legitimacy,” including debates about their methods
and limits for dispute resolution. Id. at 471. While this holds true for many dispute settlements created in the past two decades, it is especially true of international investment disputes. Id. at 471–72.
117. Julie A. Maupin, Transparency in International Investment Law: The Good, the Bad
and the Murky, in TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 142, 144, 148, 151 (Andrea Bianchi & Anne Peters eds., 2013).
118. See EUROPEAN FED’N, supra note 60, at 26 (discussing the “regulatory chill” of a
government in three instances: “a) not drafting particular legislation in anticipation of arbitration, b) chilling legislation upon awareness of arbitration risks, and c) chilling legislation after the outcome of a specific dispute”). In Stephan Schill’s post, The Constitutional
Frontiers of International Economic Law, BLOG EUR. J. INT’L L. (Mar. 9, 2017), https://
www.ejiltalk.org/author/sschill/ [https://perma.cc/WL35-DPAF], he discusses the increasing
intersection between international and constitutional law, as international tribunals are
called on to review whether constitutional law is in line with a state’s obligations under
international law, and other times to apply domestic constitutional law directly.
119. Alison Giest, Comment, Interpreting Public Interest Provisions in International Investment Treaties, 18 CHI. J. INT’L L. 321, 323 (2017).
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making ISDS unpopular in the public sphere. ISDS has even been
called “a massive Trojan horse” by Yannick Jadot, a spokesperson
for the Green Party of the European Parliament, who went on to
explain that ISDS could be “used by multinational corporations to
whittle away EU standards and regulations across a range of policies from the environment to food safety to social protection.” 120
The British publication, The Economist, similarly stated,
If you wanted to convince the public that international trade agreements are a way to let multinational companies get rich at the expense
of ordinary people, this is what you would do: give foreign firms a special right to apply to a secretive tribunal of highly paid corporate lawyers for compensation whenever a government passes a law to, say,
discourage smoking, protect the environment or prevent a nuclear catastrophe. Yet that is precisely what thousands of trade and investment treaties over the past half century have done, through a process
known as “investor-state dispute settlement”, or ISDS. 121

However, it is important to acknowledge that limitations do exist.
Investors cannot challenge regulatory changes carte blanche, but
rather may only initiate proceedings if the host state has promised
to refrain from those specific changes. 122
Additionally, ISDS tribunals consistently respect state regulation when it is related to public policy, such as when citizen health
is at stake. The recent Philip Morris v. Uruguay case provides an
example of an ISDS tribunal, ICSID, respecting legitimate state
regulation despite investor claims. 123 In February 2010, investor
Philip Morris International sought damages against Uruguay for
its plain packaging legislation, which prohibited different packaging for different cigarettes (for example, it prohibited Marlboro Red
and Marlboro Gold from having distinct packaging). 124 The legislation was geared to protect public health, and it required certain
pictures displaying the adverse effects of smoking to be displayed

120. See Press Release, The Greens: European Free All. in the European Parliament,
EU-US Trade Negotiations (TTIP) (Jan. 21, 2014), https://www.greens-efa.eu/en/article/euus-trade-negotiations-ttip/ [https://perma.cc/AYQ6-NUQD].
121. The Arbitration Game, ECONOMIST (Oct. 11, 2014), https://www.economist.com/fin
ance-and-economics/2014/10/11/the-arbitration-game [https://perma.cc/3BVJ-9UQE].
122. Brower & Schill, supra note 1, at 488; see also Schill, supra note 118 (discussing
how the relationship between the EU Member States and the CJEU can serve as inspiration
for a cooperative approach).
123. See Philip Morris Brands Sárl v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 300 (July 8, 2016).
124. Id. ¶ 10.
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on up to eighty percent of the packaging for all cigarettes. 125 Philip
Morris challenged the national legislation, claiming that it devalued its investment in the country. 126 The company demanded that
either the smoking regulations be repealed or not applied to them;
or, alternatively, compensation for damages. 127 On July 8, 2016,
ICSID dismissed Philip Morris’s claim. 128 Philip Morris was ordered to pay Uruguay seven million dollars as a refund for legal
fees. 129 ICSID recognized the adoption of health protection
measures aimed at protecting the health of the people of Uruguay
as an “exercise of the legitimate power of a sovereign country.” 130
Similarly, in November of 2011, Philip Morris Asia brought the
first investor-state dispute claim against Australia. 131 Philip Morris Asia challenged the Australian Tobacco Plain Packaging Act,
which restricted cigarette companies from displaying any individualized logo or branding on their packaging. 132 The tribunal did not
reach the merits of the issue. 133 However, it did find that Philip
Morris Asia’s claim was an abuse of process because Philip Morris
Asia acquired an Australian subsidiary for the sole purpose of acquiring standing to challenge Australia’s tobacco plain packaging
laws. 134 This supports the notion that ISDS is meant to be a fair
forum, rather than a way for an investor to take advantage of the
State and control its regulatory power by abusing the process.

125. Id. ¶¶ 11, ¶ 13.
126. Id. ¶ 12.
127. Id.
128. Graciela Rodriguez-Ferrand, Uruguay: Arbitration Panel Affirms Enforcement of
Anti-Tobacco Legislation, LIBR. CONGRESS (Aug. 26, 2016), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreignnews/article/uruguay-arbitration-panel-affirms-enforcement-of-anti-tobacco-legislation/
[https://perma.cc/49D3-U939].
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12,
Notice of Arbitration, ¶ 1.1 (Nov. 21, 2011); Tobacco Plain Packaging—Investor-State
Arbitration, AUSTL. GOV’T ATT’Y GEN. DEP’T, https://www.ag.gov.au /Internationalrelations/
InternationalLaw/Pages/Tobaccoplainpackaging.aspx
[https://perma.cc/LGM8-RCWW]
(last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
132. Ankita Ritwik, Tobacco Packaging Arbitration and the State’s Ability to Legislate,
54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 523, 523 (2013).
133. Tobacco Plain Packaging—Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 131.
134. Id.
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B. The “Consistency” Concern: Various Ad Hoc Tribunals Lead to
Inconsistent Results
The second issue with ISDS is the need for consistency, specifically the idea that: (1) consistency in decisions rendered is lacking;
and (2) an appellate body could ameliorate this problem. This part
addresses the consistency issue and analyzes the potential effects
of a permanent court, including an exploration of whether sufficient reforms could instead be incorporated into the current ISDS
system.
1. Decisions Rendered in ISDS Cases Lack Consistency
Unlike the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) or the UN, “international investment law has no hierarchy, no central organizing
body, and no historical genesis or originating document acknowledged by all.” 135 Instead, it consists of “around 3,000 overlapping
bilateral and regional treaties, tens of thousands of transnational
contracts, and an unknown number of domestic statutes whose
purported aim is to stimulate economic development by attracting
and protecting foreign investments within the sovereign territories
of individual host States.” 136 Providing a consistent body of investment law has proven to be difficult, in part because ISDS contains
aspects of both public international law and private commercial
arbitration.
Significant inconsistencies are not the norm in international investment arbitration, but they do exist. Argentina has experienced
inconsistent ISDS decisions firsthand while participating in ICSID
arbitration. 137 In 2001, Argentina suffered one of its worst financial crises. 138 As a result, Argentina introduced a package of emergency laws, which implied a considerable change in the conditions
135.
136.
137.

See Maupin, supra note 117, at 143–44.
Id. at 144.
Oscar Lopez, Smart Move: Argentina to Leave the ICSID, 1 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
ONLINE 121, 123 (2014) (footnotes omitted), http://cornellilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014
/01/Lopez-Smart-Move-Argentina-to-Leave-the-ICSID-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/85B6-DZ
TM]. Ironically, “for much of the twentieth century, Argentina required [foreign] investors
to submit contractual disputes . . . to local courts for remedy.” Goodman, supra note 63, at
451. However, to facilitate capital, Argentina eventually abandoned this policy and signed
the ICSID Convention. Id. Argentina entered into bilateral agreements with the United
States and over thirty other countries which did not require claims to be brought to domestic
courts before international arbitration. Id.
138. Lopez, supra note 137, at 122.
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under which foreign investors had to operate. 139 This led to dozens
of ISDS cases against the country. 140 “Although the devaluation
operated across the board and affected all creditors, companies
such as BP, France Telecom, Siemens, and Suez . . . pursued
claims against Argentina for breach of contract and international
treaty law . . . .” 141 Many bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) contain nonprecluded measures (“NPM”) clauses that limit investor
protections in certain situations, “allow[ing] a country to take actions inconsistent with treaty obligations when necessary for the
maintenance of public order, national security, or other essential
security interests.” 142 Though many of these cases addressed exactly the same postcrisis emergency laws, the investors brought
forth very similar arguments, and Argentina used a practically
identical series of defenses, ICSID results were strikingly different
based on varying interpretations of these NPM clauses. 143
For example, in LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID found that Argentina’s actions during the Argentine Crisis
of 2001 fell under Article XI of the BIT with the United States,
which exempts a state from payment if the actions taken were necessary to preserve public order. 144 By contrast in Sempra Energy
International v. Argentine Republic and Enron Corp. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID found that actions Argentina took during the
same 2001 financial crisis were not covered by the necessity exception, making it unclear to the Argentine government what actions
it may take during times of financial crisis. 145
Critics argue that creating a permanent court system would promote consistency in a way that has not been created through ad

139. See Ley de Emergencia Publica y de Reforma del Regimen Cambiario, Law No.
25.561, Jan. 1, 2002, [29810] B.O. 1-2 (Arg.); Goodman, supra note 63, at 478.
140. Federico Lavopa, Opinion, Crisis, Emergency Measures and Failure of the ISDS System: The Case of Argentina, INTER PRESS SERV. (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.ipsnews.net/
2015/08/opinion-crisis-emergency-measures-and-failure-of-the-isds-system-the-case-of-arg
entina/ [https://perma.cc/DT2M-AX9U]; Goodman, supra note 63, at 451–52.
141. Goodman, supra note 63, at 452.
142. Id. at 475–76.
143. Lavopa, supra note 140.
144. LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Award, ¶ 2
(July 25, 2007); see also Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9,
Award, ¶ 173 (Sept. 5, 2008).
145. See Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award,
¶ 346 (Sept. 28, 2007); Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
Award, ¶ 339 (May 22, 2007).
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hoc tribunals. 146 “Dispute settlement has a central function in stabilizing the expectations of foreign investors and enables them to
counter opportunistic behavior by the host state, such as unreasonable interferences with the investor’s economic rights.” 147 Though,
technically speaking, there is no stare decisis in international investment law disputes, a permanent tribunal may have a higher
likelihood of rendering decisions that are more consistent with one
another. 148 Not only could a permanent court be seen as more legitimate, but it could also help to create predictability in investment law, a benefit for both states and investors. 149
However, fixing the problem of consistency comes with its own
set of challenges and concerns. Establishing a permanent court to
solve the issue of inconsistency may have a detrimental impact on
state sovereignty protection. The ad hoc nature of the ISDS system
is important to many investors. “Apart from the question of who
sits as [arbitrators], and who appoints or elects them, permanent
institutions may display stronger dynamics in enlarging their jurisprudential powers than a system of one-off arbitral tribunals.” 150 While a permanent investment body may begin to create
consistent investment law, certain principles that might develop
are likely to affect states in different ways. In this scenario, certain
states will emerge as “decision makers,” while other states may not
agree with the shifts they see taking place, moving the process further away from a democratic influence. 151 While a permanent court
may create consistency, it may not necessarily lead to the development of widely accepted and just principles. “[C]onsistency alone,
which theoretically could be achieved with the current system,
wouldn’t fix the soundness of the law produced. Consistency isn’t a
silver bullet. It is only good if the contents of the law are sound.” 152
State sovereignty is likely to be more harmed than helped by the
creation of a permanent court that utilizes permanent judges and
creates a consistent body of law.

146. See Brower & Schill, supra note 1, at 474.
147. Id. at 477.
148. Schill, supra note 14, at 8 (“[T]he extent to which permanent institutions can increase consistency in decision making will also depend on the applicable law. If the law
remains essentially enshrined in bilateral treaties, consistency will be more difficult to
achieve, and perhaps be contrary to the intentions of state parties than in a multilateral
setting.”).
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Grisel & Schultz, supra note 5.
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One of the major issues that causes inconsistency is a tribunal’s
treatment of substantive rights granted to investors. 153 Public international law rights such as the right to “fair and equitable treatment” and the State’s obligation to “observe its commitments,”
which are included in investor-state treaties, have been interpreted and applied differently. 154 This application has important
consequences on liability. 155 Textual ambiguity arising from compromise language is common, especially because treaties are not
only concerned with legal implications, but are also negotiated
with economic, political, and social concerns in mind. 156
The shift towards BITs in international investments, which are
uniquely negotiated between two entities, suggests that parties
may be less interested in having all legal standards consistent
across the board. 157 However, there are methods of creating consistency that are treaty based, rather than tribunal based. One solution that has been implemented in trade and commercial law is
to use “Model Treaties” of investment protection that “aim[] to promote uniformity in treaty practice.” 158 Using Model Treaties encourages the formation of norms in customary law by spreading

153. A typical investment treaty generally provides investors with a combination
of up to seven different substantive rights. First, investors are often guaranteed
the payment of adequate compensation in the event an investment is expropriated. Second, Sovereigns are prohibited from enacting currency controls so as to
promote the free flow of capital. Third, Sovereigns are required not to discriminate on the basis of nationality; this typically means investors cannot be treated
worse than the Sovereign’s own citizens or other foreigners. Fourth, Sovereigns
promise to treat investments fairly and equitably. Fifth, Sovereigns promise to
provide full protection and security to an investment. Sixth, sovereigns guarantee that investments will not be treated less favorably than the minimum standard required by customary international law. Finally, Sovereigns sometimes
agree to honor commitments they have made regarding an investment.
Franck, supra note 60, at 1530–32 (footnotes omitted). In United States agreements, American investors in foreign countries have protections such as freedom from discrimination,
protection against uncompensated expropriation of property, protection against denial of
justice, and the right to transfer capital. See Fact Sheet, supra note 2.
154. Franck, supra note 60, at 1523.
155. Id.
156. Locknie Hsu, Examining the Formative Aspect of Investment Treaty Commitments:
Lessons from Commercial Law and Trade Law, in RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 221, 224 (Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 2015).
157. Id. at 225; Todd Allee & Clint Peinhardt, Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining over Dispute Resolution Provisions, 54 INT’L STUD. Q. 1, 6
(2010).
158. Hsu, supra note 156, at 226.
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State practice, 159 while still allowing states to depart from the format for special circumstances. 160 Interpreting the same model provision in various treaties would likely lead to consistent outcomes,
which could solve the interpretation issue without a permanent
body.
Other than model provisions, current ISDS ad hoc tribunals can
clarify certain standards to make interpretation simpler and more
predictable. For example, “Fair and Equitable Treatment” is both
a substantive right of investors and a catch-all phrase that is the
subject of many investment claims, often utilized to challenge public policy measures in ISDS proceedings. 161 Article 8.10 of CETA
lists the types of conduct that constitute a breach of the “Fair and
Equitable Treatment” standard. 162 The North American Free
Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) has done something similar. 163 After
early arbitral tribunals gave different interpretations of the “Fair
and Equitable” provision of the NAFTA text, NAFTA Free Trade
Commission issued a binding interpretation on July 21, 2001 to
clarify. 164 Similarly, in their own treaties, parties can explicitly define what behavior falls under substantive rights granted to investors. Making the standard clearer within each specific investment
treaty would necessitate less interpretation in the first place. This
option promotes consistency while respecting the uniqueness of the
negotiating history and the intent of the parties.

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Franck, supra note 60, at 1530–31; BEUC, supra note 93, at 3.
162. BEUC, supra note 93, at 3 (citing CETA, supra note 29, at art. 8.10).
163. Catherine Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law 10–11 (OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs,
Working Paper No. 3, 2004), https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2004_3.
pdf [https://perma.cc/D8VY-HGB4].
164. Id. According to the interpretation:
Article 1105 (1) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard
of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to
investments of investors of another Party. The concepts of “fair and equitable
treatment” and “full protection and security” do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law
minimum standard of treatment of aliens. A determination that there has been
a breach of another provision of the NAFTA, or of a separate international
agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of Article 1105 (1).
Id. at 11.
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2. Adding an Appellate Body as a Possible Solution
Another major change that has been proposed to solve the consistency problem is the creation of an appellate tribunal to ensure
errors in fact or law can be corrected, thereby promoting consistency. 165 Currently, without a higher court, there is no designated entity to control judicial errors, and there is no legislative
body to control a tribunal’s law-making activities. 166 ISDS tribunals are not legislative bodies, but by adding an appellate body,
there exists the potential to become “self-correcting mechanisms in
terms of the interpretation and development of the rules of international law.” 167 An appellate tribunal would be able to modify a
lower tribunal’s decision, reverse it, or remand the matter for further consideration. 168
While it is too early to determine exactly what the MIC would
look like, the idea is to model it based on both domestic and international courts and tribunals like the WTO, which is composed of
a first instance panel and an appellate body. 169 Therefore, it is
worth looking at the WTO’s Appellate Body to discover issues that
could appear in the potential MIC. The WTO Appellate Body—“established in 1995 under Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) . . . .
is a standing body of seven persons” who serve four-year terms and
hear appeals. 170 The Appellate Body issues an Appellate Body Report, which is circulated to WTO Members within ninety days of
the notice of appeal filing, and becomes public immediately upon
circulation to Members. 171 In its report, “[t]he Appellate Body may
uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the
[WTO] Panel” that issued the original decision. 172 The report is
165. SUBEDI, supra note 5, at 251. This idea gained more momentum in 2007, after an
ICSID annulment committee found an error in the application of law by a prior tribunal but
noted that there was not much it could do about it. Id.
166. See Schill, supra note 14, at 3.
167. SUBEDI, supra note 5, at 248.
168. THE EU SUCCEEDS, supra note 34, at 3.
169. O’Connor & Aquilini, supra note 30, at 22.
170. Appellate Body, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_
e/appellate_body_e.htm [https://perma.cc/5S9D-TFYF] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
171. Appellate Body Members, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_
e/dispu_e/ab_members_descrp_e.htm [https://perma.cc/K4TB-98V9] (last visited Dec. 1,
2018).
172. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm [https://per
ma.cc/G9H8-GM4X] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
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then adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”), which must
then be accepted by the parties to the dispute. 173 Out of the seven
Members, three are selected to each case. 174 These Members are
chosen by the parties to the dispute. 175 Before finalizing the Appellate Body Reports, a three-Member division assigned to a case will
exchange views with other Appellate Body Members to help maintain consistency and coherence in decisions. 176
However, the WTO demonstrates that the addition of an appellate mechanism to promote consistency has the potential to
lengthen procedures, which can drive up costs and keep important
issues from being solved in an efficient manner. In respect to the
WTO Appellate Body:
[T]he number of issues raised on appeal, the number of participants
and third participants, the total length of submissions, as well as an
accumulation of jurisprudence [has increased]. As a result, Appellate
Body proceedings now as a rule exceed, in some cases significantly,
the 90-day timeframe prescribed by the Dispute Settlement Understanding. 177

While a large caseload suggests confidence in the Appellate Body,
deadlines are being extended and efficiency is being compromised. 178 Additionally, WTO cases have become more labor intensive. 179 Parties are more often asking the WTO Appellate Body to
reopen the factual record in a case, versus merely ruling on the
first instance panel’s legal interpretation. 180 Further, choosing who
will staff the MIC Appellate Body revives old issues of politicization surrounding the selection process. While instituting an appellate body is a better alternative to a permanent system, it could
potentially make the process more complicated and costly in a detrimental way.

173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Experiences from the WTO Appellate Body, 38 TEX. INT’L
L.J. 469, 471 (2003).
176. Appellate Body Members, supra note 171.
177. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, The Workload of the WTO Appellate Body: Problems and
Remedies, 20 J. INT’L ECON. L. 705 (2017).
178. Alex Lawson, The WTO’s Appellate Body Crisis Is Getting Worse, LAW360 (Aug. 25,
2017, 7:35 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/957758/the-wto-s-appellate-body-crisis-isgetting-worse [https://perma.cc/QS8P-A5NP].
179. Id.
180. Id.
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C. The “Transparency” Concern: Secretive Nature of Proceedings
Increases Anti-ISDS Bias
The third concern of the current ISDS system is the lack of transparency, namely: (1) lack of transparency in proceedings; and (2)
the need for third-party participation. While the transparency issue is still a major criticism of the ISDS system, it has largely already been addressed. This section addresses these two facets of
the transparency problem to analyze whether a permanent court
could be a solution, and considers reforms to the current system
that would not require a permanent court structure.
1. ISDS Proceedings Lack Transparency
While transparency is an important issue in ISDS proceedings,
the public is not completely in the dark about all aspects of international investments. Major multilateral conventions, like ICSID,
as well as many bilateral and regional treaties are matters of public record. 181 Yet, accessibility to the treaty text is far different from
privity to the inner workings of the tribunal in a particular case.
In investment dispute proceedings, published information can be
limited about the existence of a particular dispute, the dispute procedure, substantive aspects of the case, and the results. 182 Hearings may be “held in camera and the documents submitted by the
parties remain confidential in principle.” 183 Further, the award
granted is only published if the parties desire it to be. 184 However,
it is important to note that significant progress has been made
overall in the transparency area, and many issues have already
been addressed. “Transparency within international investment
law has come a long way in a short time. In the pre-NAFTA era of
only 18 years ago, it seems fair to say that opacity was the norm
and transparency the exception. Today the situation is mixed.” 185
Although there is no general obligation of confidentiality in
ISDS currently, a presumption of respect exists for the principles

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See Maupin, supra note 117, at 151.
NEW SYSTEM FOR RESOLVING DISPUTES, supra note 19, at 3.
VADI, supra note 58, at 58.
Id.
Maupin, supra note 117, at 170.
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of confidentiality and privacy. 186 Introducing mandatory transparency into investment cases would defeat the principle of confidentiality that is important to investors. 187 ISDS through “neutral and
confidential arbitration is one of the pillars of international investment law . . . recognized by every major capital importing and exporting nation in the world.” 188 Mandatory confidentiality could
greatly tip the balance envisioned for ISDS by not respecting the
investor as an autonomous private entity. Investment disputes are
unlike many other disputes recognized in the international sphere
between states. While it is ideal that investors feel a sense of obligation to the citizens of the host state, an investor’s duty to the
public differs from a host state’s obligation of openness to its people.
Therefore, encouraging, rather than requiring, transparency is
likely the best solution and there are multiple reasons why the international community should encourage transparency in disputes. Transparent proceedings have the potential to enhance the
quality of democratic deliberation about risk and its control, especially in key areas like health and the environment, by fostering
more access to information and participation by the public. 189 Tailoring the ISDS rules to allow for as much transparency as possible
is a solution that maintains the balance between a state’s responsibility to its people and a private investor’s right to business confidentiality.
Currently in ICSID, parties are able to tailor the level of transparency in proceedings. Parties can agree on what information and
documents that they want to keep confidential, and may agree that
document publication is to be considered on a case-by-case basis. 190
Once the parties agree on a level of confidentiality for a particular
proceeding, the agreement is typically signed and adopted by the
Tribunal in a formal order. 191 “The agreement may allow either
party to designate documents as confidential, in part or whole,” or

186. EUROPEAN FED’N, supra note 60, at 16.
187. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 227.
188. Id. at 248 (emphasis added).
189. William Magnuson, WTO Jurisprudence & Its Critiques: The Appellate Body’s AntiConstitutional Resistance, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 121, 129–30 (2010).
190. Confidentiality and Transparency—ICSID Convention Arbitration, INT'L CTR.
SETTLEMENT INV. DISPS., https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/Confidentiality-andTransparency.aspx [https://perma.cc/9TUF-D22X] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
191. Id.
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to allow specific portions of the document to be redacted before being made public. 192 Parties may also allow public access to hearings
in person or through web or video broadcasting. 193 If parties utilize
this option, additional measures can be taken to protect privileged
information by suspending portions of the hearing from broadcast. 194
Another solution recently adopted by UNCITRAL is the creation
of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules (“Rules”) which are automatically applied to current investment agreements. 195 In 2014,
UNCITRAL reviewed its transparency requirements for investorstate arbitration, and created these updated Rules. 196 The Rules
reverse the historic confidentiality presumption, but aim to create
a balance by being open, while also protecting confidential business
information and national interests. 197 The Rules only apply in investor-state claims arising out of treaties adopted after the enactment of the revised Rules on April 1, 2014 (unless the parties opt
out), but the Rules can be adopted by treaties negotiated before
their creation if the parties agree, or by a proactive amendment to
the agreement. 198 The new Rules change proceedings in important
ways, for example, by requiring publication of decisions and certain
documents and opening proceedings to the public unless the tribunal decides otherwise. 199 Further indicating the shift toward confi-

192.
193.

Id.
INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, ICSID CONVENTION ARBITRATION
RULES r.32 (2006) [hereinafter ICSID ARBITRATION RULES], http://icsidfiles.worldbank.
org/icsid/icsid/StaticFiles/basicdoc/partF.htm [https://perma.cc/LM2K-MBVS].
194. Confidentiality and Transparency—ICSID Convention Arbitration, supra note 190.
195. UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, RULES ON TRANSPARENCY IN
TREATY-BASED INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 5 (2014) [hereinafter UNCITRAL RULES],
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Tra
nsparency-E.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X8P-M9DE].
196. Id. at 1–2.
197. See EUROPEAN FED’N, supra note 60, at 16.
198. UNCITRAL RULES, supra note 195, at 5. Article 1 of the UNCITRAL Rules on
Transparency states that:
In investor-State arbitrations initiated under the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules pursuant to a treaty concluded before 1 April 2014, these Rules shall
apply only when:
(a) The parties to an arbitration (the “disputing parties”) agree to their
application in respect of that arbitration; or
(b) The Parties to the treaty or, in the case of a multilateral treaty, the
State of the claimant and the respondent State, have agreed after 1 April
2014 to their application.
Id.
199. See UNCITRAL RULES, supra note 195, at 10; Giest, supra note 119, at 332.
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dentiality, the UN adopted the Rules at the Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration. 200 Overall,
strides have been made to increase and encourage transparency in
ISDS proceedings, making this issue less significant than it has
been in the past.
2. The Importance of Third-Party Participation
International investment tribunal decisions may determine the
legality of national legislation in relation to an international investment agreement. 201 In light of the potential consequences
these decisions could have on stakeholders and citizens of the host
state, critics are surprised at the high level of confidentiality surrounding some of these proceedings. 202 Proponents of transparency
believe that third parties who are impacted by decisions rendered
in ISDS are more likely to accept these decisions if they are produced in a transparent manner. 203 Thus, incorporating third parties into the process may be a way to alleviate the transparency
problem. For example, many ISDS tribunals have allowed amicus
curiae submissions by public interest groups. 204 “In [United States]
cases, amicus briefs have [long] been submitted by a variety of
[non-governmental organizations], including the Sierra Club,
Friends of the Earth, and Center for International Environmental
Law.” 205 Additionally, if key international governmental and nongovernmental organizations in active fields, like the protection of
human rights, public health, or the environment, are consulted before decisions are rendered, these decisions may be viewed as more
legitimate. 206 Allowing amicus briefs to be included more frequently in international investment agreements could help to ensure that parties who are affected by ISDS decisions have the opportunity to be heard. Encouraging participation from outside
sources would likely serve to boost public faith in ISDS overall.

200. EUROPEAN FED’N, supra note 60, at 16; UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-BASED INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 1, 5
(2015), https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/transparency-convention/Tra
nsparency-Convention-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QQF-73GE].
201. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 229–30.
202. Id. at 227.
203. See id.
204. See VADI, supra note 58, at 59.
205. Fact Sheet, supra note 2.
206. KAUFMANN-KOHLER & POTESTÀ, supra note 77, at 73.
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CONCLUSION
Since the 1980’s, investor-state arbitration has become a standard feature in international investment agreements, and evaluating the ad hoc nature of current ISDS tribunals is a relevant issue
in today’s global community. 207 Proposed solutions range from a
return to state-to-state arbitration on one end of the spectrum, to
a permanent investment court on the other. 208 However, creating
a permanent investment court has the potential to drastically alter
a system that was put in place for particular reasons. Though a
permanent investment court may address some of the criticisms of
the ISDS mechanism as it currently exists, it will likely disrupt
key objectives of ISDS, including the balance between the protection of state sovereignty and the recognition of an investor as an
autonomous private entity. Though parties are not forced to use
permanent courts over traditional ISDS methods, it is important
for states who may only see the solutions created by the ICS or
MIC to consider the long term effects. Some of these short term
solutions may end up causing the very same issues they were
meant to fix.
A permanent investment court, like the ICS or MIC, may be a
premature way to solve state concerns. Though notable states have
withdrawn (or discussed withdrawing from) treaties with ISDS
mechanisms recently, there does not seem to be unified reason for
doing so that would warrant a “one size fits all” solution. Stephan
Schill, a well-respected author who writes on the ISDS topic, notes
that:
[r]ather than speaking the language of nationalism and protectionism
[as the United States has done, especially President Donald Trump],
opposition in the EU invokes constitutional values and rights—
namely democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights—which
are leveraged against mega-regionals and the institutions they come
with, notably investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) and regulatory
cooperation. 209

NAFTA, which has been a hot topic in the news lately, serves as
an example. The Trump administration has sharply criticized

207. Id. at 11–12.
208. Brower & Schill, supra note 1, at 475.
209. Schill, supra note 118; see Gideon Rachman, Donald Trump Leads a Global Revival
of Nationalism, FIN. TIMES (June 25, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/59a37a38-785711e8-8e67-1e1a0846c475 [https://perma.cc/ZC26-R92M].
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NAFTA’s ISDS mechanism, which allows investors to bring claims
against NAFTA countries. 210 In comparison, the Canadian government has been pushing to keep the ISDS system with “watereddown procedural changes,” and Mexico still sees ISDS as a positive
means to attract more foreign investors. 211
Differences in perspective even exist from one administration to
the next. President Trump’s outlook stands in stark contrast to
President Obama’s, which was less concerned with the United
States’ vulnerability to suits in ISDS tribunals. 212 Instead, President Obama focused on the fact that the United States had never
lost an investment case. 213 This shift in the United States may be,
therefore, a reflection of a renewed sense of nationalism and isolationism, rather than a belief that ad hoc ISDS tribunals are illegitimate without permanency.
In addition, the ICS or the MIC would likely negatively impact
host states. “With no option but to turn to the investment court
[ICS] to resolve disputes, other companies will ‘either not invest at
all, or . . . include the higher political risk in the prices of the investment.’” 214 This would be especially detrimental to states who
need investments to aid their economies, and therefore possess less
bargaining power. Big companies with leverage could end up making their own favorable deals, reminiscent of the pre-ISDS era. 215
The ISDS mechanism has finally reached a point where it has
been in operation long enough, and has been utilized enough, to
have its advantages and disadvantages analyzed by the global
community. 216 Earlier in the comment, the question was posed regarding whether solutions are being created simply because the
210. Jeff Spross, President Trump Doesn’t Actually Have the Power to Repeal NAFTA,
WEEK (Mar. 26, 2018) http://theweek.com/articles/762714/ [https://perma.cc/WVC6-HM2T]
(“[The administration] wants to roll back NAFTA’s Investor-State Dispute Settlement
(ISDS) rules, which basically allow businesses to sue NAFTA countries over regulations and
such. Both the Tea Party right and the Sanders left hate this setup for a variety of reasons.”).
211. Id.
212. Rob Howse, If Trump Doesn’t Withdraw U.S. Consent to Be Sued in International
Investment Tribunals, Expect the New Protectionism to Generate Claims for Billions from
Foreign Interests, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (Mar. 30, 2017), https://worldtradelaw.typ
epad.com/ielpblog/2017/03/if-trump-doesnt-withdraw-us-consent-to-be-sued-in-internation
al-investment-tribunalsexpect-the-new-p.html [https://perma.cc/U542-FGDG].
213. Id.
214. See Ross, supra note 29.
215. Id.
216. SUBEDI, supra note 5, at 255 (“[E]xisting investment dispute settlement institutions
‘were not designed to address complex issues of public policy that now routinely come into
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ISDS mechanism is broken, or whether these solutions are a result
of a shift that has taken place in global community priorities that
warrants such a drastic reform. 217 Because the ICS and the MIC
are likely to result in an overall move away from the original aims
of ISDS, it is important for the international community to seriously reevaluate its goals in regard to solving investment disputes.
This should certainly take place before implementation of the MIC.
Though times have changed, the original purpose of ISDS is still
honored today. It may be unwise to trade a longstanding ISDS system that was built to respect foundational elements of international investing, with a reformed permanent investment court
based on the ever-changing preferences of today.
Emily Palombo *

play in investor-State disputes.’” (footnote omitted)).
217. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. For example, could the desire for transparency be related to the modern availability of information based on technology? If so,
would this shift in attitude warrant overthrowing an accepted regime, rather than simply
fixing it in more modest ways? As put by commentator Julie Maupin:
We must ask ourselves not only whether transparency is desirable within international investment law, but also transparency in respect of what and visà-vis whom? Only in light of the answers to these questions can we begin to
fulfill the . . . mandate of querying the degree to which the international investment regime may manifest an existing or evolving international law norm
of transparency.
See Maupin, supra note 117, at 143.
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, University of Richmond School of Law. B.A., 2014, Christopher
Newport University. I am grateful to Professor Chiara Giorgetti for her thoughtful comments on my draft, and to Emma Greger and the rest of the University of Richmond Law
Review staff for their time and effort spent ensuring this comment was ready for publication.

